Free Trade in the Twenty-First Century: Economic Theory and Political Reality
edited by Max Rangeley and Daniel Hannan
Springer Nature, 2025; xii + 691 pp.
I’ll admit that I opened this book wondering whether free trade had become yesterday’s news, and half expecting a eulogy. Though I approached the book both as a student of free trade and as a firm believer in its principles, the question felt inevitable at a time when contemporary discourse seems preoccupied with determining who should pursue protectionism and how, rather than weighing whether it ought to be pursued at all.
As just one example, the US Supreme Court decision of February 2026 restricting presidential emergency powers to set tariffs did little to strengthen free trade. The ruling had no real impact on tariff setting, nor was such an outcome its purpose. Still, any measure to cut away tariffs and other protective measures reveals, like a hydra, two or more measures meant to replace it. Whatever the institutional nuances between the legislative and executive branches in the United States, it is difficult to imagine anyone campaigning openly for free trade today, in America or elsewhere. At this, one might well echo Ludwig von Mises, who, “disillusioned with the official free-trade movement, returned his focus to the battle of ideas” nearly a century ago (Hülsmann 2007, 582).
However optimistically, the thirty-seven essays in this volume, organized into five sections, aim both to provide educational material for a new generation of students of free trade who will aim to change this state of affairs and to return to the battle of ideas. In this, the collection thoroughly succeeds, and the breadth of the contributions alone is reassuring at a time when the intellectual defense of free trade feels fragile.
For those of us living in Britain, it is easy to forget that this country once led the world not only in commerce, but also in articulating the doctrine of free trade. To remind us, the editors quote Richard Cobden at length in the introduction. And in a fascinating, standout essay, Stephen Davies (77–94) explores the cultural politics surrounding the public debate and political efforts in favor of free trade during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in England. He concludes that these disputes were never fundamentally about economic efficiency or policy design, but rather about a clash of “two contrasting sets of social ideals” (89–90), each carrying different economic implications. Today, as then, the doctrine of free trade can succeed only if political and public discourse can
connect the idea of the free exchange of goods between people in all parts of the world as a social and economic activity with all of the other social ideals that go along with it, . . . [such as] international peace and reduction of armaments, a different vision of the international rule of law to the currently dominant top-down one that sees it as generated by treaties, a social ideal of personal self-government and responsibility, the principle of voluntary cooperation and collective action as a way to address challenges and social problems, limited and decentralised government, popular culture of the “democratic intellect,” and a focus on improving the conditions of life through unplanned cooperation rather than competition for power between nations. (93)
This observation resonates strongly today, when polarization increasingly pushes economic reasoning into the background, subordinated to wider (geo)political and social anxieties, which are also discussed in many of the contributions in this collection. Perhaps this is inevitable, since trade is not merely a profitable commercial activity, but one of the ultimate vehicles for human development and flourishing, as Mark Thornton (117–31) argues in his essay. It must therefore be understood within a broader cultural context and conception of human progress, and trade policy must be assessed for its multifaceted implications for other policies. For example, as Thornton demonstrates, “enacting substantive domestic intervention in the economy can create incentives and political pressure for protectionist policies, which in turn can produce antagonistic foreign policy” (124).
Free trade also requires a sound monetary system—one free from inflationary and expansionary monetary policies, which are, as Dominic Frisby (379) aptly calls them, “patient zero” in the battle to save the world from protectionism. The essays in the “Monetary Economics and Global Trade” section are therefore particularly valuable in highlighting this frequently overlooked dimension. In a later section, “Free Trade and Free Markets,” Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Karl-Friedrich Israel (659–74) provide a detailed examination of trade driven by the printing press, demonstrating that any benefits that may arise from subsidies, new money, or foreign exchange interventions are only temporary and are “likely to entail significant log-rolling and other forms of rent-seeking by the beneficiaries, along with corresponding deadweight losses for the economy as a whole” (670).
The section on “the good, the bad, and the ugly” of economic policy is likewise highly instructive and offers considerable insight into the political realities of trade policymaking. Phillip Magness (429–43) shows how the 1930s witnessed a period of unchecked interest-group influence on tariff formation, a dynamic that seems to be returning as the global order weakens. Keith Jakee and Stephen Turner (445–67) approach a similar problem from the perspective of transaction cost economics, arguing that the costs of maintaining the peace and predictability required for global free trade are exceedingly high for any country to face alone. Although I welcome the inclusion of transaction costs in a trade theory and policy discussion, I am perhaps unconvinced by Jakee and Turner’s conclusion. The transaction costs of “institution building” may well be too high for governments, largely because of their own inefficiencies and inability to perform economic calculation. Yet a free market would be capable of creating the local and global institutions necessary to sustain free trade.
The policymakers’ perspectives included in the book echo many of these themes, though they also reveal the bureaucratic burdens that seem to accompany any government activity. Liz Truss’s (201–13) account makes this immediately clear. Her contribution, like others in the section “The Viewpoints of Senior Policy-Makers,” offers multiple excuses for why free trade is not (easily or rather at all) accomplished in practice but fewer actual solutions. In my skepticism of these excuses, let me offer a counterexample: The Cobden–Chevalier Treaty of 1860 consisted of a short list of articles which, once implemented, produced rapid development and strengthened manufacturing in both England and France (Becuwe et al. 2021) and, according to Cobden’s own campaign, reduced the incentives for war, as Davies (83) shows. Such a treaty does not require complex paperwork, but its effects, if clearly articulated, would be more than palatable to many voters in many countries today. The Cobden–Chevalier Treaty succeeded because the political figures truly championed it, unlike those who succeeded them (the treaty eventually was ended). For international negotiations to work, therefore, as Syed Kamall (159–86) notes, politicians must stop “seeking to keep as many bargaining chips as possible to open overseas markets while protecting domestic markets” (183). They must genuinely endorse free trade and its benefits or—and here is a radical idea—simply step aside.
There are far too many valuable essays in this book to discuss in a brief review, though Anthony Evans and Wioletta Nawrot’s (631–42) contribution, offering practical guidance on teaching free trade to students, deserves special mention for its clarity and usefulness. Overall, it is encouraging to witness so many contributors seeking, in Rangeley and Hannan’s words, to “recapture some of the moral fervour of [free trade’s] original advocates, the sense that they were engaged in a great and just cause” (vi).
Free trade is indeed such a cause. Like the leaven in the Gospel (Matt. 13:33), which, once worked into the dough, quietly transforms it, the battle of ideas in defense of free trade will, in time, reshape our economies for the better.
Until then, we wait patiently and continue the fight.